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COMMON SENSE ABOUT ORIGINAL AND SUBSEQUENT
UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
Kent Greenawall
INTRODUCTION

It's all very confusing. The Supreme Court has adopted the view
that both original religion clauses have significant substantive content, that the Fourteenth Amendment applies those clauses against
the states, and that both clauses confer individual rights against the
federal and state governments. Critics have challenged these conclusions from various directions: the Establishment Clause was (or both
clauses were) purely jurisdictional, concerned only with federal-state
relations; together the clauses left the federal government no power
to deal with religion; the Establishment Clause created only a political duty, not individual rights; its substantive content was much less
than the Supreme Court has assumed; neither clause was incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment; the Free Exercise Clause was susceptible to incorporation but the Establishment
Clause was not.
This Essay is mainly about the Establishment Clause, but it covers
analogous questions about free exercise as well. I try to untangle the
threads of various controversies, concentrating primarily on what
seems fairly resolvable on examination, while also noting uncertainties that do not yield to easy analysis. I ask how constitutional language should have been and should be interpreted, adopting a strategy that gives weight to ordinary meaning and to the general sense of
why that language was adopted. I do not eschew reference to legislative history; however for our purposes in this Essay, legislative history
turns out to be less than crucial. I have not undertaken research of
the original sources, but I believe existing research suffices for the issues we shall examine.'

University Professor, Columbia University. B.A., Swarthmore College, 1958; B. Phil., Oxford University, 1960; LL.B., Columbia University, 1963. His most recent book, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS?, appeared in 2005. RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, VOLUME I:
FAIRNESS AND FREE EXERCISE will appear in the summer of 2006, published by Princeton University Press. I am very grateful to Sachin Panlya for his extremely helpful research assistance and
to Philip Hamburger for his acute critical comments.
Cf STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 17 (1995) (analyzing these problems
with-

out relying on newly discovered evidence or novel methods of interpretation).
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The central premise of the Essay is that certain questions about
the scope of the religion clauses are more simply answered than some
distinguished scholars have suggested. Two corollaries are that the
Supreme Court has not committed a gross blunder in developing the
scope of those clauses, and that the widely held view of the clauses as
having a dual character is sound.2 More particularly, the Establishment Clause was, at its origins, both jurisdictional and substantive. It,
like the Free Exercise Clause, had content that was properly incorporated against the states, and it has rightly been interpreted to create
individual rights.
Although I claim that the main questions I address yield relatively
simple answers, regrettably, that does not mean the necessary analysis
is simple. Because the competing positions about original content
overlap so greatly in their practical implications, the task of delineating precise differences and explaining why certain understandings
are not plausible becomes almost tortuous.
I. THE ORIGINAL RELIGION CLAUSES AS BOTH JURISDICTIONAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE

A. Three Possibilities,with Variations
The initial question we shall face is whether the religion clauses
created ordinary substantive constraints, set jurisdictional limits, withdrew the subject of religion from Congress altogether, or performed
some combination of these legal operations. Although one's theory
of the Fourteenth Amendment may make it unnecessary to resolve
the scope of the original religion clauses, some theories about how
the clauses should now be interpreted rest on claims about the original understanding. In any event, we serve intellectual clarity by starting there. Because grasping the differences among competing theories is required for comparative evaluation, I begin by unpacking
possible original approaches and the consequences they would have
entailed for the law of the newly formed republic.
The beginning of the First Amendment reads: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting

See id. at 18 (describing the dualistic view as "virtually ubiquitous"). But see Steven K.
Green, Federalism and the Establishment Clause: A Reassessment, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 761 (2005)
(discussing the separationist approach to the Establishment Clause); Douglas Laycock, Two
Problems in the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause: Religious Exemptions,
and the Claim That the Clause Was Really About Federalism, Paper presented at the Legal
Theory Workshop at the Columbia University School of Law (Dec. 12, 2005) (manuscript at 35, on file with author),
available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/dlaycock/
TwoProblems.pdf (challenging the claims that the Establishment Clause was mostly or only
about federalism).
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the free exercise thereof ....
"s The religion clauses created ordinary
substantive constraints if, in whatever areas of authority Congress possessed, it was not allowed to prohibit free exercise or make a law respecting an establishment of religion.' If the clauses were exclusively
substantive, they did no more. The clauses would have been jurisdictional if they directed that the subject of religion was left to the states.
If one or both clauses were purely jurisdictional, Congress would have
been free in domains of exclusive federal authority (domains that did
not touch state power) to deal with religious subjects as might a state
unconstrained by the clause (s). If the clauses withdrew the subject of
religion altogether from Congress, then Congress could not have legislated about the subject of religion in any context. Congress would
have been barred from dealing with religion in federal domains to
the same degree as it was barred in its relation to the states.
These three possibilities coalesce around a core of limitation on
congressional power, and it is this core of common understanding
that can give us difficulty in identifying how the theories conflict.
Even if Congress had been acting to carry out a delegated power, say,
to regulate interstate commerce or enforce a treaty, it could not have
prohibited the free exercise of religion or established a religion in a
manner that would interfere with normal state authority. Thus, to
promote benefits for Americans in England, Congress could not have
acted under the treaty power to suppress the worship of Catholics or
to grant special benefits to Episcopalian churches within the states. If
the constitutional language "respecting an establishment of religion"
were taken to foreclose anti-establishment laws affecting the states, as
well as pro-establishment laws, Congress could not have exercised the
treaty power to require equal treatment of the Catholic religion
within states whose establishments preferred Protestant denominations over Roman Catholicism.
Differences among the three basic theories exhibit themselves
when we inquire about Congress's power to promote free exercise
within the states and to legislate within federal domains that do not
intermix with areas of state authority. These domains include the organization of Congress and other parts of the federal government,
the operation of embassies and diplomatic missions, the regulation of
federal military forces, control of the District of Columbia (once that
3 U.S. CONST. amend.
I.

Steven Smith has cautioned that any constraint on powers of Congress is substantive in a
sense. SMITH, supra note 1, at 25-26. In this essay, "substantive" is given a meaning that contrasts with "jurisdictional" and with the withdrawal of all power over the entire subject of religion. In an essay yet to be published, Smith suggests that the jurisdictional approach might be
called federalist and reflects at length on what might lead one to characterize an approach as
jurisdictional or substantive. Steven D. Smith, The JurisdictionalEstablishment Clause, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming June 2006) (manuscript at 21, 42-62, on file with author).
4
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was created) 5 and control of the federal territories. In these domains,
federal laws about religion would not have interfered with any state's
decisions about how to treat religion within its own borders.6
If the religion clauses were substantive in the ordinary sense, Congress could not have prohibited free exercise or established religion
within these federal domains (barring some argument that a particular federal domain, such as territorial government, was not subject to
this part of the Constitution). If both the religion clauses were purely
jurisdictional vis-A-vis the states, Congress could have treated religion
as it chose within federal domains. If the Free Exercise Clause was
substantive and the Establishment Clause was purely jurisdictional,
Congress could not have prohibited free exercise in federal domains,
but it could have created forms of establishment that did not impair
free exercise. If the religion clauses withdrew the subject of religion
from federal authority altogether, Congress could not have acted with
respect to religion in federal domains. It also could not have aimed
to promote free exercise and it could not have enacted religious exemptions (unless exemptions would not have counted as acting with
respect to religion). 8
The main battleground over whether a clause was substantive, jurisdictional, or withdrew all power concerns the Establishment
Clause. However, we can understand this debate better if we also
consider similar possibilities with respect to the Free Exercise Clause.
The arguments on behalf of substantive orjurisdictional content have
a positive and a negative aspect. The positive aspect is that a clause
has the particular kind of scope that is being asserted; the negative
aspect is that the same clause does not have an additional, different
kind of scope. As we shall see, with regard to the Establishment
Clause, the positive aspects of the arguments on each side carry more
force than the negative aspects. The nearly irresistible conclusion,

5 Although the District of Columbia did not become the seat of the federal
government
until 1800, the original Constitution already provided for such a district over which Congress
shall "exercise exclusive Legislation." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Thus, when the Bill of
Rights was adopted, the existence of the district had already been envisioned. Id.
6 I do not assume that the exact boundary of federal domains is
clear. For example, states
might have claimed that federal military forces drawn from state militias still fell within an area
of state concern.
7 See Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Religion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1069,
1091-93, 1118-23
(1998) (arguing that textual and historical evidence supports a complete denial of federal authority over religion). Lash adds the possible qualification that the territories may not have
been subject to First Amendment limits. Id. at 1119-21; see also Laycock, supra note 2 (manuscript at 38-42) (discussing a version of the "no power" approach made by Virginia in its petition for certiorari in Bass v. Madison, 125 S. Ct. 2536 (2005), and concluding that it is incoherent).
8 See Lash, supra note 7, at 1110-11 (reading the Free Exercise Clause
as permitting Congress to specifically avoid abridgement of religious exercise "by granting exemptions").
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one that fits well with prevailing doctrine, is that both religion clauses
originally had substantive content, and that the Establishment Clause
had jurisdictional effect for overlapping areas of federal and state authority. This conclusion rules out a "no power" approach to the
clauses taken together.
B. Textual Arguments
The argument in favor of substantive content relies on text and
history. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof' 9 reads like a substantive limit on what Congress may do. Whatever authority it might
otherwise have had under the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement a delegated power, Congress could not prohibit the free exercise of religion or make a law respecting its establishment.
The language of the Free Exercise Clause is distinctly one-sided.
Congress may not prohibit free exercise (or perhaps abridge free exercise in ways that fall short of outright prohibition); Congress may
protect free exercise. Thus, if we looked only at the Free Exercise
Clause,' o we would conclude that Congress could implement a treaty
protecting the free exercise of religion of foreign citizens in the
country. For example, during the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress sent a message to the dominantly Roman Catholic citizens of Quebec assuring them that "we hold sacred the rights of conscience and may promise ... the free and undisturbed exercise

of.. . religion."" Suppose that, during the War of 1812, the United
States had wished to enlist the support of a Catholic country, and that
country had in return wanted a guarantee that its citizens could worship freely throughout the United States. Giving such a guarantee
would have been an appropriate exercise of the treaty power, and
Congress could have implemented the treaty with a law protecting
freedom of worship for the citizens of our new ally. Had only the
Free Exercise Clause been involved (had there been no Establish-

9 U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
10It may be argued that the enactors did not distinguish between the Free Exercise and Es-

tablishment Clauses, and that this differentiation between prohibiting and protecting is flawed
at its foundations. See generally SMITH, supranote 1, at 36 (summarizing the academic critique of
the apparent opposition between the two clauses). But this challenge is not persuasive. Although many opponents of establishment saw their position as based on claims of free exercise,
supporters of establishment generally favored free exercise as well. However inattentive to nuance members of Congress and state legislatures may have been, the connotations of the two
phrases were sufficiently different so that their legal effect would not have overlapped completely.
1 JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 74 (2d ed.
2005).
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ment Clause), the law would have been effective even if it interfered
with some aspect of a state's establishment of religion."
The relevance of the Free Exercise Clause for exclusive federal
domains also seems straightforward (apart from the question whether
"prohibiting" includes lesser abridgements and the more troubling
question whether the clause ever bars the application of neutral laws
that interfere with religious practices). Were we to look only at the
Free Exercise Clause, we would conclude that Congress may not prohibit free exercise within federal domains. It would be an extremely
odd reading of the clause's language to conclude that Congress could
have prohibited free exercise within domains such as the federal military and the District of Columbia. The clause, taken alone, definitely
seems to allow Congress to protect free exercise within federal domains.
The argument that the content of the Establishment Clause is
substantive is also strong, although the language of the clause presents a serious issue about what it forbids, and this issue spills over to
the practical scope of the Free Exercise Clause. "[R] especting an establishment of religion" definitely appears to forbid something more
than the creation of an outright establishment. It may forbid measures that move toward an establishment but fall short of creating one,
or it may forbid anti-establishment as well as pro-establishment measures, or it may enact both of these consequences. If the clause was
designed only to be anti-establishment, why might drafters have included the word "respecting"? Assuming that it represented more
than a stylistic choice, the language could have been responsive to
disagreements about what institutions and practices amounted to an

I am assuming that, on reflection, people then would have realized that under the treaty
power, the federal government could adopt laws that would not have been justified under some
other power. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (holding that the test of the validity of a treaty is not whether the government has the power to do the same thing by an act of
Congress). In any event, this treaty could have been justified under the war power. I also assume that for this purpose, it would not have mattered if a treaty required implementing legislation or was self-executing; that is, I am assuming that "Congress shall make no law" covers the
Senate in its power to ratify treaties. (Insofar as that conclusion is subject to doubt, one may
take my claims as covering treaties that were not self-executing but implemented by ordinary
legislation.)
There were varying opinions on the power of the original federal government to make
12

treaties touching religion. Compare 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 191-92 (Jonathan Elliot, ed., Washington D.C., 2d

ed. 1836), available at http://rs6.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.html (statement of Mr. Henry
Abbot on July 30, 1788) ("It is feared, by some people, that, by the power of making treaties,
they might make a treaty engaging with foreign powers to adopt the Roman Catholic religion in
the United States, which would prevent the people from worshipping God according to their
own consciences."), with id. at 194 (response by Mr. Iredell) ("The power to make treaties can
never be supposed to include a right to establish a foreign religion among ourselves, though it
might authorize a toleration of others.").
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establishment, providing a legal standard that did not require drawing that exact line, or it could have been purposefully designed to
prohibit measures moving toward an establishment but definitely falling short. But when one considers that about half the states then
had regimes that some people regarded as establishing religion, 3 the
word "respecting" seems also to have some content that protected state
establishments; a federal law that interfered with a state establishment
of religion would, in any ordinary sense, be a law "respecting" an establishment of religion. If Congress could not have interfered with
state establishments, it would have been barred from doing so even
under what would otherwise be a proper exercise of its treaty power.
We may characterize this particular aspect of the Establishment
Clause as jurisdictional, forbidding interferences with state decisions
about whether to establish religion.
This conclusion leaves us with a delicate question about the Free
Exercise Clause and state authority. Would any law protecting free
exercise have been a law "respecting an establishment of religion"?
Recall the hypothetical treaty protecting Catholic worship by foreign
nationals that interfered with aspects of state establishments. Perhaps
the law implementing the treaty would have been barred by the Establishment Clause. If any law protecting free exercise would have
amounted to a law respecting an establishment of religion, then the
clauses together would have barred any federal interference with how
states treated religion. For federal relations with states, this reading
of the clauses together yields the same incapacity of federal authority
as does a purely jurisdictional or a "no power" reading.
However, it seems highly doubtful that every law protecting the
exercise of religion would have been "respecting an establishment" as
that phrase might then have been understood. For example, some
states that indisputably did not have establishments, nevertheless had
religious exemptions of various kinds and maintained oaths of office
that only Christians could sincerely take.14 Suppose the government
signed a treaty with a prospective ally that had a large Jewish population, and guaranteed that Jewish citizens would have equal rights to
exercise their religion, including an equal opportunity to attain office
within states. 5 Congress's protection of this right for Jewish citizens
might have promoted free exercise without interfering with state establishments (at least in those states that did not have establishments).

15See SMITH, supra note 1, at 37-41 (discussing laws in the founding period of the United
States which were predicated on religious beliefs).
14 See Laycock, supra note 2 (manuscript at 11-15) (on exemptions); SMITH,
supra note 1, at
38 (on oaths).
15 Such a law might have been an unacceptable federal interference with the methods of
state governance.
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Thus, even a two-sided Establishment Clause-one barring both proestablishment and anti-establishment legislation-would not have
precluded every congressional attempt to protect free exercise within
the states.
What implications does a substantive reading of the Establishment
Clause have for federal domains, the domains that are exclusive of
state power? Obviously, Congress could not have established a religion in the federal territories, in the District of Columbia, or in the
halls of Congress. If nothing concerning an establishment already
existed, the bar on laws respecting an establishment of religion was
anti-establishment in its force.
We can imagine two ways in which the clause might have been proestablishment, in the sense of preventing laws against establishment.
It could have precluded Congressional interference with establishments that preexisted the acquisition of federal territory or that were
subsequently instituted by territorial legislatures. We can dispose of
both possibilities quickly. When the federal government acquires territory from a foreign government, Congress must authorize the continuance of laws in force in the territory. 6 Had Congress acquired
territory that had an established Roman Catholic church, we may say
that whether it continued the establishment or not, it made a law "respecting" an establishment of religion. But obviously Congress must
have been able to make one of the only two conceivable choices. Authorizing a continuing establishment would have violated the Establishment Clause; terminating the establishment would not.
With respect to the territories, Congress generally has absolute
discretion to decide how much authority to delegate to a territorial
legislature. 7 Asserting that the territorial legislature could establish a
religion but Congress could not would invert the usual relationship
in an odd manner. (If a territorial legislature with a general grant of
authority from Congress could establish a religion, we would suppose
Congress could do the same thing directly.) Concluding that Congress could not then terminate an establishment created by the territorial legislature, because that would be a law "respecting an establishment of religion," would be odder still.
Does a conclusion that Congress may not have moved toward establishment of religion in federal domains mean it was barred from
all legislation protecting free exercise? Suppose Congress adopted a
law protecting pacifist conscientious objectors living within the terri16See

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of... Rules

and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property....").
17 See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 586
n.16 (1976) ("The powers vested in Congress by Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, to govern Territories
are broad.").
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tories from military service, or provided that employees of the federal
government who treated Saturday as the sabbath did not have to work
on that day. Suppose the Senate approved a treaty that guaranteed
all citizens the right to worship freely in a newly acquired territory.'8
These measures would have protected free exercise, but they would
not then have been understood as "respecting an establishment."
Neither clause would have precluded them.
Before we look at competing ways to understand the text, let me
clarify the exercise we have just gone through and take stock of where
our textual argument leaves us with respect to the "no power" and jurisdictional approaches. I am by no means claiming that most of the
textual implications I have drawn generally were perceived at the
time, or indeed that all of them were perceived by anyone. 19 As with
all legislation, the text had implications that no one may have seen.
And certainly with regard to the understanding of the two religion
clauses, we have examined some subtleties that would have been far
from anyone's attentions. What I have been trying to do, in a very
rough manner, is to approach each problem as might members of
Congress or courts who were then carefully considering the validity of
a piece of proposed or adopted legislation in light of the religion
clauses.
How does the textual approach I have suggested differ from the
purely jurisdictional and "no power" readings of the text of both
clauses? As far as federal-state relations, the difference is modest if
the Establishment Clause is taken to bar anti-establishment interferences with state regimes. The "no power" reading is that Congress
had no power to legislate about religion; a purely jurisdictional readIs The

treaty-making power has been used to protect the free exercise of a religion in a fed-

eral territory. See Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits Between the United States and His
Catholic Majesty, U.S.-Spain, art. V, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252, 256, cited in 11 TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, at 530
(Charles I. Bevans ed., 1968) ("The Inhabitants of the ceded Territories shall be secured in the
free exercise of their Religion, without any restriction .. . .") (ceding Florida to United States);
Cession of Louisiana, U.S.-Fr., art. III, Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200, 202, cited in 7 TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, at 813

(Charles I. Bevans ed., 1968) ("The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in
the Union of the United States and admitted as soon as possible according to the principles of
the federal Constitution to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States, and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the
free enjoyment of their liberty, property and the Religion which they profess."); see also Treaty
of Peace Concluded Between the United States of America and His Highness Omar Bashaw Dey
of Algiers, U.S.-Alg., art. XV, June 30 and July 3, 1815, 8 Stat. 224, 226, cited in 5 TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, at 48

(Charles I. Bevans ed., 1968) ("[T]he Consuls and agents of both nations, shall have liberty to
Celebrate the rights of their respective religions in their own houses.").
19 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 26-27 (explaining that the disinterest members of the First
Congress displayed about the content of the First Amendment was probably a consequence of
their understanding that religion was left to the states).
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ing of both clauses together is similar: religion was completely left to

the states.20 The reading proposed here leaves open the possibility
that some permissible federal legislation might have been protective
of free exercise but not respecting an establishment. That possibility,
which may not have concerned anyone at the time, is all that distinguishes our reading from its two competitors. (The differences
among approaches would be more substantial if the Establishment
Clause were taken only to bar pro-establishment measures, not antiestablishment ones.)
If one gave a jurisdictional reading to the Establishment Clause
and a substantive reading to the Free Exercise Clause, the consequences for federal-state power would be exactly those we have
traced. To say that Congress has no 'jurisdiction" to establish religion within the states or to interfere with state establishments is the
same as saying that Congress cannot issue pro-establishment or antiestablishment legislation that impinges on state authority.
Our textual reading of the clauses mainly differs from the other
approaches with respect to federal domains. According to a "no
power" reading, Congress had no authority to legislate with respect to
religion in (relevant) federal domains.2 ' Thus, Congress could not
have legislated to protect free exercise even if it steered clear of establishment.
As a textual argument, the "no power" approach is much less appealing than the reading we have given. The Free Exercise Clause is
cast in terms of laws prohibiting free exercise. That certainly sounds
as if laws protecting free exercise are not forbidden. And if the implication of the bar on laws respecting a religion is effectively antiestablishment within federal domains, the two clauses together do
not seem to preclude laws that protect free exercise but do not move
toward an establishment.
This conclusion is strengthened by reference to the rest of the
First Amendment and to the original Constitution. The other clauses
that are tacked onto "Congress shall make no law... 2 2 are definitely
one-sided. Congress may protect freedom of speech and of the press;
it may not abridge them. The Free Exercise Clause reads similarly.2
No one considered the parts of the original Constitution that forbid any religious test for federal offices and permit affirmation rather

20
21

Id. at 27.
See Lash, supra note 7, at 1098 (raising the possibility that the territories may not have

been subject to the First Amendment).
U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the
free exercise [of
religion.]").
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than oath, measures that protect religious exercise, 24 as an establishment of religion or moving toward an establishment of religion;
Congress could have enacted those measures had the original Constitution not provided them. 25 And if Congress could have enacted
these measures without violating the Establishment Clause, might it
not have enacted some similar measures that could have protected
religious exercise? Perhaps most importantly, Douglas Laycock has
written that he has been unable to find a single contemporaneous
suggestion that legislated exemptions on religious grounds constituted establishments of religion.26 Insofar as silence can be taken as
evidence of a positive position, it does not follow that every conceivable kind of exemption would be regarded as acceptable, but it does
strongly suggest the possibility of some measures that could have protected free exercise without "respecting" an establishment, some
measures regarding religion that Congress had power to enact.
A final textual argument against the "no power" approach concerns possible alternative language. If the drafters had wanted to remove all such power from Congress, it would have been simple to
write that "Congress shall make no law respecting religion" or "touching religion" (in the words of an earlier draft proposed by Representative Samuel Livermore)." The availability of a simpler means to
state a consequence is one reason not to read more complicated language as enacting that very effect.
According to the jurisdictional reading of both clauses, Congress
had the same power within federal domains as the states had within
their domains. That is, within federal territories and the District of
Columbia, Congress might have established religion and prohibited
its free exercise. If the Free Exercise Clause had substantive content
but the Establishment Clause was purely jurisdictional, Congress
could have moved toward establishing religion in federal domains so
long as it did not interfere with free exercise. The textual argument
for a purely jurisdictional reading of both clauses is yet weaker than
the "no power" argument. That is because nothing in the clauses
themselves indicates that they are irrelevant for federal domains. Just

24

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (providing that "no religious Test" shall be used to determine

qualification for federal public office and that all public officials, federal and state, shall be
bound by "Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution").
To be clear, the issue is not whether these clauses in the original Constitution became
unconstitutional when the First Amendment was adopted. The clauses were not adopted by
Congress, so they would have survived even were they "respecting an establishment." Id. The
issue is whether to understand that phrase in a way that would have barred Congress from doing by statute what the text of the original Constitution had done, if the original Constitution
had remained silent on the subjects of tests and oaths.
26 Laycock, supra note 2 (manuscript at 22-28).
27 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 33 (1998).
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as the First Amendment appears to say that Congress cannot abridge
freedom of speech or of the press in the territories or in the District
of Columbia, so also it appears to say that Congress cannot prohibit
the free exercise of religion in those domains. And the bar on laws
respecting an establishment of religion seems to preclude Congress's
creating an established religion within a federal domain.
One possible textual argument for a jurisdictional reading is developed by Akhil Amar. He emphasizes that the language "'Congress
shall make no law... '.differs radically from that of the seven next
amendments. Each of these amendments assumes a range of federal authority and places limits on the exercise of power within that
range-for example, the Fourth Amendment which forbids unreasonable searches and the Fifth Amendment which confers a right to
jury trial in criminal and civil cases. The language, "'Congress shall
make no law,"' Amar remarks, "precisely tracked and inverted the exact wording" of the Necessary and Proper Clause in the original
Constitution, ° a parallel that further confirms that the entire First
Amendment was mainly about protecting state authority from federal
interference.31
A second textual argument applies only to the Establishment
Clause. If Congress cannot make a law "respecting" an establishment
of religion, that means it cannot either impose an establishment on
the states or interfere with state establishments that may exist.
These textual arguments are, by themselves, not powerful counters to our initial reading. Much of the rest of the Bill of Rights concerns evils that may commonly occur without legislation, particularly
in the administration of courts. That is an obvious reason why they
are not framed explicitly in terms of restraints on Congress. It would
be a huge leap from discerning an inversion of language of the original granting of congressional powers to concluding that the First
Amendment has no relevance when the power of Congress is otherwise plenary, as in the District of Columbia and federal territories. As
far as the argument about the text of the Establishment Clause is
concerned, if one grants, as I have, that the "respecting" language
28

Id. at 36-37. Amar also notes that as originally adopted by Congress, this amendment fol-

lowed two other amendments (not approved by enough states) that were structural rather than
protective of individual rights. See id. at 8-19 (providing an overview of the original first two
amendments, which dealt with the number of representatives in Congress and the salaries of
senators and representatives, respectively, and the arguments for and against their ratification).
2 Id. at
39.
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper.... .").
31 Nevertheless, Amar concludes that the Free Exercise Clause was one-sided and that
it did
not forbid federal protection of free exercise within states, whereas the Establishment Clause
was purely jurisdictional. AMAR, supra note 27, at 41. For my answer to the argument that the
enactors did not distinguish between the two religion clauses, see supra note 10.
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apparently protected state establishments from federal interference,
it hardly follows that the clause did not apply at all to federal domains.
C. HistoricalArguments
Having suggested that the most plausible reading of the religion
clauses is that they have substantive content, with the Free Exercise
Clause barring the interference with free exercise in all areas of federal responsibility and with the Establishment Clause barring the establishment of religion in all areas of federal responsibility (exclusive
or not) and also barring interference with state establishments, I turn
now to various historical arguments about the legal significance of
the two clauses. We may divide the historical arguments into roughly
three categories. The first concerns the background of the religion
clauses-including ideas about individual rights, religion, and government at the time; relations between religion and government
within the separate states; and the debate over the original Constitution leading up to the Bill of Rights. The second kind of historical
argument relies on the drafting and adoption of the religion clauses.
The third kind concerns measures taken by Congress at around the
time the Bill of Rights was adopted-the assumption being that Congress would not lightly have approved legislation that would conflict
with a constitutional mandate-as well as views of prominent figures
about what the clauses accomplished.
The historical argument for a substantive understanding of the
Free Exercise Clause is straightforward. In his account of the setting
of the religion clauses in history,John Witte divides the founders into32
Puritans, Evangelicals, Republicans, and Enlightenment exponents.
According to Witte, all these groups embraced the idea of "liberty of
conscience," which was often conflated with other phrases, including
"free exercise of religion" and "religious freedom." 3 Even those who
supported forms of established religion acknowledged that individuals should be able to follow the dictates of their own consciences with
respect to religion and to join with others to practice their religion.34
Early state constitutions guaranteed free exercise in some form, such
as "the free exercise of religious worship.0 5 Noah Feldman, although
dissenting from Witte's categorization of major strands of opinion
and claiming a dominance for a Lockean conception of liberty of

32

WITrE, supra note 11, at 22-35.

3

Id. at 41.

34

Id. at 42-45.

35 Id. at 46.
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conscience not to be found in Witte,"5 concurs with Witte that "by the
late eighteenth century it was broadly agreed in the colonies that
there was
a basic, indeed natural, right called 'liberty of con3 7
science.'

Steven Smith has pointed out that in states with free exercise protections there were also sabbath observances, blasphemy laws, and religious standards for holding office. 3s Given broad disagreement
about what "free exercise" entailed, he doubts that the enactors intended to mandate a principle of free exercise in the First Amendment.39 But Smith does not contend that any figures of the time actually favored what they considered to be prohibitions of free
exercise. We are familiar with legislators enacting a principle into law
even when they disagree about its scope. We have very good 4 reason
to suppose that is what happened with respect to free exercise. 0
Whatever may be true about the Establishment Clause, the Free
Exercise Clause seemed a natural way to protect liberty of religious
conscience. Nothing in the progress of various drafts through Congress points to a contrary conclusion. James Madison's original draft
for the House included " [t] he civil rights of none shall be abridged
on account equalrighs
of
religious belief or worship
...
nor shall• the full and
ofconscencebe
.
,41
equal rights of conscience be ...infringed.
(Madison also pro-

posed a protection against state violations of rights of conscience that
fell by the wayside.42 ) One might conclude that coverage of the final
Free Exercise Clause differed in some degree from the original formulation by Madison with regard to its restraint on the federal government. Nothing in the drafting history regarding free exercise,
however, suggests that the drafting Congress was neutral about the
free exercise of religion, or, more particularly, that Congress would
be free to "prohibit" free exercise in purely federal domains. By far
the more plausible rendering is that the drafters and adopters did
not think Congress should prohibit free exercise, whatever the head

See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346,
373-74 (2002) (arguing that the academic concept of competing schools of thought regarding
the separation of church and state in colonial America is unpersuasive insofar as it ignores
broader Lockean concepts of "liberty of conscience").
37Id.at 374.
38 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 37-39 (describing different state laws governing
certain reli-

gious practices and activities).
3 Id. at 38-39.
Given the wide understanding that Congress had virtually no power to legislate
about religion in the states, any disagreement about the scope of free exercise would have been seen as
having little practical importance.
WITrE, supra note 11, at 81.
42

-.
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of power under which it acted. 43 As far as I am aware, no action taken
by Congress around the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted
would have been regarded by many legislators as prohibiting the free
exercise of religion.
What I have written so far does not resolve whether by some combination of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, along with
the Tenth Amendment, Congress was barred from trying to protect
free exercise within states, even when acting under some delegated
power such as the treaty power. I return to that subject below.
The historical arguments about the Establishment Clause are
more complex and controversial than those over the Free Exercise
Clause. On the one hand, there is the claim found in various Supreme Court opinions, beginning with Everson v. Board of Education,4
that the founders strongly believed in disestablishment as an aspect of
religious liberty. 5 That view is supported by Noah Feldman, who asserts that the common belief in liberty of conscience, including a
right not to be forced to contribute to religion, underlies the Establishment Clause.46 Many defenders of what we would now consider to
be establishments of religion urged that various non-preferential systems of support were not true establishments. 47 Thus, the number of
those who in 1789 were prepared to defend what they themselves
characterized as establishments was limited. That the First Amendment would forbid Congress from establishing a religion fit contemporary views.
What about members of Congress and members of state legislatures who understood their own states to have a kind of establishment
of religion of which they approved? Even they might well have
wished that the federal government not undertake an establishment
in federal domains, given the risk that such a federal establishment
would not be to their liking. They might have supposed that states
did not need protection for their own support of religion, whether
establishments or not, because the
original delegated powers of Con48
gress did not reach that subject.

43 Kurt Lash has written that "[plower to promote free exercise was itself power
to promote
religious orthodoxy." Lash, supranote 7, at 1105. But it does not follow that the drafters took a
similarly dim view of prohibiting and promoting free exercise.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
45 Id. at 35 n.15.
46 See Feldman, supra note 36, at 373-74 (arguing that taxonomies emphasizing
the importance of religion in maintaining civic and republican virtue ignore the principle of liberty of
conscience underlying the Establishment Clause).
47 See THOMASJ. CuRRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 172-91 (1986) (presenting
historical examples
of debates over what constituted an establishment).
48 See Laycock, supra note 2 (manuscript at 35). They might also have
supposed that the
Tenth Amendment supported that position.
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There are a number of historical arguments which oppose a reading of the religion clauses that makes the Free Exercise Clause substantive in favor of free exercise, and the Establishment Clause purely
substantive against establishment. The most general of these arguments reverts to the very reason why the First Amendment was
adopted. When state conventions considered the ratification of the
original Constitution, Anti-Federalists complained that it failed to
protect individual rights against abridgements by the federal government. 5 A consistent theme of Federalist defenders was that
speech and religion were subjects of state authority, not within the
delegated powers of the federal government.50 New Hampshire's
proposal that the Constitution be amended to provide that "Congress
shall make no laws touching religion,"5' adequately reflected this concern that the new government not involve itself with religion. The
current version of the First Amendment was adopted in order to respond to the concern of the Anti-Federalists about impingements on
state authority.
Two more particular historical arguments apply to the Establishment Clause alone. At the time of the Bill of Rights, seven states retained what we now consider establishments of some varietyi' At the
time, there was much disagreement about exactly what forms of support to religion were enough to constitute an establishment. Enough
people criticized arrangements within these seven states as establishment, so that members of Congress from these states would have
hesitated to accept a provision that was purely anti-establishment,
and legislatures in those states would have hesitated to approve such
a provision. We need to understand the clause as one that people
with opposing views about establishment could have endorsed.54 A
clause that forbade establishment of a national religion and forbade
the interference with state establishments meets this criterion.

49 See Lash, supranote 7, at 1085 (describing concern of some Anti-Federalists that Congress
might enforce a religious orthodoxy).
See id. at 1085-86 (discussing Congress's lack of power regarding religion).
51 AMAR, supra note 27, at 247.
52See SMITH, supra note 1, at 31-33 (concluding that this language might have entailed a

more absolute renunciation of jurisdiction than the final language of the religion clauses).
One might, of course, view the shift from the language about "touching religion" as reflecting
an aim to provide more precise substantive limits on what Congress could do.
AMAR, supra note 27, at 32-33 (listing New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia as states retaining establishments); CURRY, supra note 47, at
188-89 (discussing Vermont as another of these states).
See SMITH, supra note 1, at 21-22 (arguing that the enactors meant to avoid first order
questions about religion); Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause,
82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1113, 1133 (1988) (describing the conflicting views at the time and the common narrow purpose finally adopted in the Establishment Clause).
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This understanding receives a degree of further support from the
relationship between the final language of the clause and earlier proposals. Madison's original proposal included the phrase "nor shall
any national religion be established," 55 and at least six successive proposals conveyed some form of prohibition of Congress's establishing
religion or establishing a religion. 6 Only when a joint committee
from the two houses met did the final phraseology of "no law respecting an establishment of Religion" emerge. If the substitution of this
language about "respecting," not contained in any state constitution,
was more than a stylistic change, it may have been designed to render
the clause more neutral between establishment and antiestablishment.
Akhil Amar sums up what he calls the jurisdictional view in the following way: "The original establishment clause, on a close reading, is
not anti-establishment but pro-states' rights; it is agnostic on the substantive issue of establishment versus 5nonestablishment
and simply
8
calls for the issue to be decided locally.

Before we turn to congressional actions around the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, we need to take stock of the historical
arguments against giving the Establishment Clause a purely antiestablishment reading. We face an initial puzzle about federalist
claims concerning the fact that, even under the original Constitution,
Congress had no authority concerning religion.59 If Congress had
plenary authority within exclusively federal domains, which was the
case in the federal territories, was it not obvious that Congress was
empowered to do something with respect to religion in those domains? And would it not also have been clear that in regulating foreign commerce or acting under the treaty power, Congress might
have protected the religious worship of foreign nationals coming to
the various states? I think we must conclude that the Federalists who
claimed that the new national government would have no power with
respect to religion either had an exceedingly narrow perspective on
how Congress might carry out delegated powers in ways that affected
the states and were simply not paying attention to federal domains or
5- WITTE, supranote 11, at 81.
56

See id. at 81-88 (describing the process through which the framers came up with the final

language of the religion clauses).
57 Id. at 88.

Philip Hamburger has written, "These words were similar to those Madison had

used to characterize his allies in Virginia, and they identified a position from which he had once
sought to distinguish his own."

PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 106

(2002).
AMAR, supra note 27, at 34; see also SMITH, supra note 1, at 17 (discussing the "purely
jurisdictional" nature of the religion clauses together).
59 Madison, for example, in the Virginia Convention said, "There is not a shadow of right
in
the general government to intermeddle with religion." SMITH, supranote 1, at 28.
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that they were addressing the major controversial possibilities of federal interference with the settled prerogatives of states. In either
event, we must take the denial of federal power with respect to religion as an oversimplification of the law of the original Constitution, an
oversimplification perhaps justified in terms of the give and take of
political debate.
That the Federalists made such claims is a reason to read the Establishment Clause, and perhaps both religion clauses, as an assurance that national power would not interfere with state decisions
about how to treat religion. The existence of partial establishments
within some states and the unexplained shift to the phrase "respecting an establishment of religion" are further reasons to read the Establishment Clause in this way. These reasons add up to a fairly
strong argument that the Establishment Clause was not exclusively
anti-establishment, that it did forbid federal interference with state
establishments.
But here is where we must be cautious. Among three possible versions of the Establishment Clause-a purely jurisdictional reading
(which would leave Congress free within federal domains to act as a
state could), a "no power" reading (which would mean that Congress
has no power whatsoever to regulate religion), and a reading that
Congress may not establish a religion for the country as a whole or
within federal domains and that it may not interfere with state establishments-all agree that the Establishment Clause protects state establishments from federal interference. Thus, much of the historical
evidence adduced in favor of a purely jurisdictional or "no power"
reading is in fact perfectly consistent with the much more plausible
reading of the text that I have suggested.61 In other words, that historical evidence does not count in favor of either a "no power" view
that Congress was without power to legislate about religion in federal
domains, or ajurisdictional view that Congress's power within federal
domains was as unfettered with regard to religion as was the power of
states.
It is with this understanding that we need to look at what Congress
actually did with respect to religion within federal domains. If Congress apparently felt as free to legislate as would a state, that would
support Steven Smith's and Akhil Amar's jurisdictional view that
Congress did not view the religion clauses, or at least did not view the
60 See WirrE, supra note 11, at 88 (describing the final days of drafting the First Amendment,
and noting that no record of the debate culminating in the present language is presently known
to exist).
61 One might think some of the evidence does count against a view that
Congress could protect free exercise within state boundaries (as through its treaty power) so long as it does not
disturb an establishment, but that is a nuance about federal authority that may have occurred to
almost no one at the time.
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Establishment Clause, as affecting congressional power within exclusively federal domains. If Congress refrained from legislating about
religion, that could support Lash's "no power" view that the religion
clauses withdrew all federal power to legislate concerning religion
(though such nonaction would also be consonant with members of
Congress believing that free exercise was adequately safeguarded and
that it had no authority to establish a religion). If Congress legislated
to a degree about religion but not in a manner that most members
would have regarded as tending to establish religion, that course of
action would most comfortably conform with the understanding I
have sketched as by far the most persuasive reading of the text, and as
consistent with the historical background we have so far examined. If
this account of congressional action strikes us as sound, we can also
find in the actions of Congress some basis to discern what kinds of
measures its members regarded as establishing religion.
Actions by Congress both before and after the adoption of the Bill
of Rights may shed light on how the religion clauses were understood. Of course, what Congress did before the adoption never presented the potential of an immediate direct conflict with the First
Amendment. So long as it did not infringe upon the original Constitution, the first Congress was free to enact measures that might be at
odds with the language of the not-yet-approved First Amendment.
And even legislation passed by Congress after adoption did not necessarily reflect a considered view of its members about what the religion clauses permitted. Certainly in the present, legislators sometimes
vote for measures that they could be fairly certain would be declared
unconstitutional, and that may not even represent their own views
about how the Constitution should be interpreted. Matters were
probably no different around 1790, and we can be sure that most
members of Congress had not thought much about the precise scope
of the Bill of Rights.
The major relevant actions by Congress were the appointment of
congressional and military chaplains, the opening of sessions of Congress by prayer, religious exemptions from import duties and from
property taxes in the District of Columbia, and various recognitions
of religion in the regulation of the territories.62
Congressional nonaction may also be significant. About the early
nineteenth century, Lash writes, "Congress ... refused to stop Sunday
mail delivery on account of the religious nature of the objections;"
and an 1829 report by Senator Richard M. Johnson indicated that the
national government was "wholly destitute of religious authority. 64
62

See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (discussing these congressional actions).
Lash, supra note 7, at 1131.
Id. (quoting Senator Richard M.Johnson).
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One might question whether a report issued forty years after the proposal of the Bill of Rights reveals anything about the original understanding of the religion clauses, but, for what it is worth, this evidence
weighs against the jurisdictional view that Congress had unfettered
authority over religion in federal domains.65 It is taken by Kurt Lash
as supporting his no-power-over-religion approach, but Senator Johnson also wrote of avoiding consequences that would amount to an establishment of religion. Thus, a legislator might have refused to
stop Sunday mail delivery based on a judgment that doing so would
move toward the establishment of a particular Christian perspective,
something that could be foreclosed by the substantive understanding
of the Establishment Clause for federal domains that I have suggested
is most plausible.
Apart from this refusal to stop the Sunday mails, the actions to
which I have referred are obstacles for Lash to overcome, since they
seem not to correspond with the "no power" understanding. Lash's
responses are that these congressional measures were not many and
not very significant, that it is doubtful whether the First Amendment
applied to the governance of the territories, where the federal government may have acted as a proto-state government, 67 and that exemptions may not have been considered actions with respect to religion.6
Were the "no power" view otherwise highly appealing, we might
be inclined to write off what Congress did in these ways. But the notion that the First Amendment had no application to territorial governance-that Congress could, in other words, gravely suppress freedom of speech, the press, and religion in the territories without
constitutional qualm -is intrinsically much less plausible than the
alternative. Absent strong positive historical evidence that the First
Amendment did not apply to the territories, we should reject that hypothesis.
Arguments starting from the actions of the first and closely succeeding bodies of Congress are founded on the premise that mem65 See HAMBURGER, supra note 57, at 200 (indicating that reports
by Senator Johnson "echoed and amplified popular fears of clerical influence").
Lash, supra note 7, at 1131 (quoting SenatorJohnson: "It is the settled conviction of the
committee that the only method [of] avoiding [the slippery slope to religious establishments] ... is to adhere strictly to the spirit of the [C]onstitution.").
67 See id. at 1120-21 (proposing that were Congress acting as a proto-state government, it
would not have undermined the principle that Congress in its usual authority did not have
power over religion).
68 See id. at 1110-11 (arguing that the text of the Free Exercise Clause is ambiguous
with regard to religious exemptions).
69 More serious questions may be raised about the application of all
the traditional procedures of English law to territories that were mostly wilderness or had previously been governed
according to French or Spanish law.
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bers would not lightly have adopted measures they believed violated
the First Amendment. Of course, legislators may not have thought
much about constitutional restraints, or even disregarded them in the
face of political reasons to vote for bills. Nonetheless, congressional
actions can contribute to one's evaluation of the likely original understanding.
Congressional chaplains were established in 1789,70 and Congress
made military chaplains "an official part of the American armed
forces in 1791." 7' Fifteen years later Congress passed an act that "earnestly recommended to all officers and soldiers diligently to attend
divine service. 72 When the federal government took over the District
of Columbia, it continued the tax exemptions for churches that existed under Virginia law, and Congress refunded duties on religious
articles to importers when a House committee so recommended.73
Congress opened its sessions with prayers,74 and the First Congress
recommended "a day of public thanksgiving and prayer. ,75 Presidents
from George Washington forward issued Thanksgiving proclamations. 7
These actions are hard to square with the "no power" view, though
Kurt Lash suggests that exemptions may not have counted as legislating about religion
. 77 and
• may have reached to a broader group of charitable activities, that symbolic acts maI not have been widely regarded as significantly about religion,' and that the provision of
chaplains was opposed by some on anti-establishment grounds.7 9 But

what Lash tells us about three later congressional reports on government-paid chaplains is much more straightforward-that the appointment of chaplains for Congress and the military falls within

70

See Lash, supra note 7, at 1133 (explaining that the First Congress was responsible for es-

tablishing the chaplain position).
71 Id. at 1132.
72

Id. at 1132 n.235.

See id. at 1127-29.
See id. at 1124 ("Beginning with the Continental Congress, continuing through the First
Congress, and down to this day, Congress has consistently opened its sessions in prayer.").
75 Id. at 1124
n.196.
76 See id. at 1123-24 (noting that every President from 1789 until the Civil
War, except Thomas Jefferson and AndrewJackson, made such a proclamation).
77 See id. at 1128 (suggesting that if Congress provided exemptions to religious
organizations
merely because they were charitable organizations, it would not have been exercising power
over religion).
See id at 1127 ("Although one might agree with Jefferson that even symbolic religious acts
by the federal government violate the concept of no federal power, there is no indication that
this opinion was widely shared in 1791-or in the following decades.").
79 See id. at 1133-34 (discussing how, in the mid-nineteenth century, criticism
of the use of
federal chaplains increased).
73
74
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delegated powers and that the Establishment Clause "merely prohibited coercive, or sectarian regulation."8 °
If these limited actions by Congress appear at odds with the "no
power" approach, they hardly provide genuine support for the claim
that either religion clause was understood to be purely jurisdictional.
Since most members of Congress would not have regarded the measures as an interference with free exercise or as an establishment, they
certainly do not tell us that Congress saw itself as having the freedom
within federal domains that states had within their own borders.
These actions do suggest that members of Congress did not suppose
that every favoring of religion whatsoever violated the Establishment
Clause, and we can infer that the courts of the time would have taken
a similar view.
In governing the territories, Congress set aside land for religious
purposes, and it financed missions," even naming particular religious
groups to receive funds. "Territorial regulations included coerced
observance of the Sabbath and prohibitions against (Christian) blasphemy. 82 A frequently cited provision of the Northwest Ordinance
was worded: "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged." 83 These measures
present a serious impediment to the view that Congress had no power
with respect to religion, unless Congress, as a proto-state government,
could adopt legislation like that of a state."
These actions adopted for the territories might, at first glance,
seem to support the jurisdictional view, but their more plausible explanation is that legislators did not perceive what they did as prohibiting free exercise or establishing religion. Even nonestablishment
states had laws restricting sabbath activities and forbidding blas80 Id

at 1134.

81 See id. at 1118 ("One of the initial acts of the First Congress was to make provisions for
churches and missionaries in the territories. This took the form of both money and land
grants." (internal citations omitted)); see also supra note 18 (discussing treaties protecting free
exercise in territories).
:2 SeeLash, supranote 7, at 1118.
3 Id. (citing NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, art. III (1787)).
With an eye toward recent Establishment Clause challenges to the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, the 107th
Congress emphasized the Religion, Morality, and Knowledge Clause of the Northwest Ordinance in the course of reaffirming that Pledge and that "In God We Trust" is the national
motto. SeeAct of Nov. 13, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-293, § 1(5), 116 Stat. 2057, 2057 (2002) (finding that "[o]n July 21, 1789, on the same day that it approved the Establishment Clause concerning religion, the First Congress of the United States also passed the Northwest Ordinance,
providing for a territorial government for lands northwest of the Ohio River, which declared:
'Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged'").
See Lash, supra note 7, at 1120 (claiming Congress acted as a proto-state government when
it authorized territorial laws to prohibit blasphemy and to mandate sabbath observance).
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phemy. 1 The grants to particular religious groups were mainly to
educate and "Christianize" Native Americans and were given to the
only organizations equipped to carry out the task.86
Congress was operating under the Articles of Confederation when
it originally approved the frequently quoted language about education and religion in the Northwest Ordinance;8 the First Congress
under the Constitution "reenacted" the Ordinance (or at least revised
it in certain respects)88 before it settled on the final wording of the Establishment Clause. One may draw at least a mild inference that
Congress would not have proposed a constitutional prohibition it believed was at odds with language it had recently adopted for the
Northwest territories.
What exactly does this crucial clause say about religion and the
schools? It does not itself establish schools. It does not require that
schools in the territory teach religion. It explicitly encourages only
education, not religion, in contrast to a rejected formulation that
would have explicitly encouraged religion.
Criticizing expansive
claims about the accommodationist thrust of the clause, one author
has argued that the clause does not even encourage the teaching of religion in schools.90 Rather, the language may mean only that if people receive an education, they will be more likely to be religious,
moral, and well-informed, and this will contribute to good government.

Although one could construe the clause in this limited fashion, it
would be highly artificial. In 1789, most education was carried out
under religious auspices. The comparatively few established public
schools did teach religion to some extent, and during the nineteenth
supra note 1, at 37-41.
Lash, supra note 7, at 1121.
87 See Thomas Nathan Peters, Note, Religion, Establishment, and the
Northwest Ordinance: A
Closer Look at an Accommodationist Argument, 89 KY. L.J. 743, 747 (2000-01) (noting that because
the Northwest Ordinance and land sales were approved while Congress operated under the Articles of Confederation, they were governed by neither the Constitution nor the restrictions
stated in the Establishment Clause).
88 See id. at 771 n.189 (suggesting that "reenactment" is not a correct
characterization of
what Congress did). The First Congress enacted two technical amendments. One declares "the
President of the United States" will receive any information originally going to "the United
States in Congress assembled." Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 50, 52-53 (1789). The
other provided that the secretary of the territory should perform the duties of the governor in
the event of a vacancy. See id. § 2, at 53. The text of the Northwest Ordinance was reprinted in
a footnote to the amendments. See id. at 51 n.(a).
89 See Peters, supra note 87, at 761-62 (discussing the legislative history of
the Northwest Ordinance).
90 See id. at 750-52 (noting that the argument that the Northwest Ordinance made the teaching of religion in schools a prerequisite to statehood is supported neither linguistically nor historically).
85 SMITH,
86

9 Id. at 751.
92 See KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 13-14 (2005).
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century, when public schools took over the main burden of American
education, they taught from a nondenominationalist Protestant perspective and engaged in devotional Bible reading. 93 Thus, in 1789,
the vast majority of legislators, whether from states with tax support
for churches or from disestablishment states, would have assumed
that education should include religion. The Northwest Ordinance
reflects that view.
This conclusion tells us nothing at all about whether the Establishment Clause was purely jurisdictional. When public education
developed in states that no longer had establishments, no one assumed that a dose of religion in their schools amounted to an establishment. If its members had assumed that the Establishment Clause
barred Congress from establishing religion in federal domains, few, if
any, would have perceived any difficulty with the clause in the Northwest Ordinance.
The setting aside of sites in land grants to encourage religion may
well be subject to similar analysis. 94 If the government controls a large
tract of land, reserving some parcels for religious institutions might
seem appropriate to accommodate the exercise of religion. Modern
zoning laws in many states require that towns make places for houses
of worship. 96 One might worry that this constitutes an establishment
of religion, but the matter is hardly clear even today. Reserving parcels for places of worship might be regarded as similar to providing
chaplains for the military and prisons. If the government controls
the time and actions of individuals, or controls a large area of land
where they may live, perhaps it may try to assure that they have an
opportunity to participate in religious activities. We need not attempt to resolve the contemporary issues regarding land designation,
and we may note that some people at the time opposed granting land
to churches as improperly taking religion into account.7 However,
we can fairly conclude that reserving land sites for undesignated religious purposes would probably not have struck most members of
Congress as violating a rule forbidding the establishment of religion,
if that rule had applied. 98 In short, given the uncertainty and disId. at 14-16.
One would want to know what the alternative would have been, that is, how religious institutions would have acquired land in the absence of a set aside.
' Further, if the land was reserved so that missions could reach out to Native Americans, the
logic of the grants may have been in terms of educating them.
93

See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, VOLUME

1:

FAIRNESS AND FREE

EXERCISE 236 (forthcoming 2006) (on file with author).
97 See Peters, supra note 87, at 762 (discussing Congress's decision to remove
a provision of
the Land Ordinance of 1785, which would have required land to be set aside for religious purposes).
98 See id. at 765-71 (discussing several land sales entered into by Congress
that explicitly set
aside parcels of land for religious purposes).
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agreement about what support amounted to an establishment, and
given the widespread assumption that many connections between
government and religion did not do so, nothing the First Congress
did indicates that its members regarded the Establishment Clause as
purely jurisdictional, as leaving Congress full scope to legislate a religious establishment in the territories and other federal domains."'
The actions of Congress are better seen in a different light, as
showing that most members of Congress lacked a highly expansive
view of what the Establishment Clause prohibited and that the members who gave any thought to the exact words "respecting an establishment" did not take them as forbidding any support of religion
that tended in any slight degree toward establishment. The actions of
the First Congress thus provide modest support for the view that its
members did not regard eve 7 form of non-preferential assistance for
religion as an establishment.
If one were a strict originalist, and one were guided exclusively by
the understanding at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, and one
tried to discern a median or consensus view (as contrasted with the
convictions of Jefferson and Madison'°1 ), one would interpret both
religion clauses more narrowly in many respects than has the modern
Supreme Court. For example, most states had laws regarding religion, such as oaths of office with religious content and clergy disqualifications from office, that are now uncontroversially thought to violate the Free Exercise Clause. 02 And very few people would then have
thought that prayers and Bible reading in state-run schools established religion.
This exact originalist approach to interpreting the religion clauses
lacks any semblance of a defense. If what should count in interpretation is original understanding, we cannot ignore understanding at
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment when we consider the rights
that the amendment guarantees against the states. It is logically conceivable that the adopters and original readers of the Fourteenth
Amendment believed that the amendment made most of the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states and that they had a highly originalist
approach to the content of those rights-that is, they took the rights
to have precisely the same scope that the original adopters and readers envisioned. This contention is logically conceivable but highly
99 See id. at 744 (listing actions taken by the First Congress that would be at odds with an interpretation forbidding Congress to legislate on the subject of religion).
too See id. at 765-71.
101See Lash, supra note 7, at 1092-98 (examining Jefferson's and Madison's views on the First

Amendment's effects on religious freedom).
102 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding invalid a state bar on clergy
holding certain public offices); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding invalid state requirements that officials declare a belief in God).
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implausible. I have yet to see any argument that legislators and citizens of 1866-1868 were originalists of this variety. In light of suggestions by Lash and Amar, among others, that the prevailing views of
both free exercise and nonestablishment were more expansive in the
mid-nineteenth century than in the late eighteenth century, 10 any serious originalist must grapple with how free exercise and nonestablishment were regarded in the mid-nineteenth century.
II. POLITICAL DUTY OR INDIVIDUAL RIGHT?
Joseph Snee has suggested that the Establishment Clause created
a political duty, not an individual right. 0 4 We might understand such
an assertion in three or four different ways. '°5 First, the distinction
between political duty and individual right might be understood at
the level of political philosophy. Thus, a right to free exercise might
be seen as a natural right; a prohibition on establishment as a matter
of institutional arrangements. Second, one conceivable legal consequence of the distinction would be that individuals would not have
standing to challenge violations of the Establishment Clause. Third,
the Establishment Clause would be unfit for incorporation against
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Due Process Clause forbids state deprivations of "liberty;" the
Privileges and Immunities Clause forbids abridgements of the "privileges or immunities of citizens.' ' 0

6

Whether one focuses on the Due

Process Clause as the engine of incorporation (the Supreme Court's
approach), or the Privileges and Immunities Clause (the more promising vehicle), a political duty account of the Establishment Clause
presents an impediment. A political duty of Congress is not a "liberty" of persons or a "privilege or immunity" of citizens, so the argument goes. That argument is what matters most to us here.
At the time the Bill of Rights was passed, opponents of establishment regarded free exercise of religion and nonestablishment as
closely tied. 0 7 Many of the strongest arguments against what dissent-

103
104

See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
SeeJoseph M. Snee, S.J., Religious Disestablishmentand the FourteenthAmendment, 1954 WASH.

U. L.Q. 371, 373 (1954) (questioning the validity of incorporating the restrictions of the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment).
105 Characterizing the Establishment Clause in terms of political duty could be employed as
an alternative way of proposing that the clause was purely jurisdictional-that it concerned relations between the federal and state governments, not whether individuals in states or federal
domains would be subject to an established religion. We may put this possible fourth understanding aside, having concluded that the clause was both jurisdictional and substantive.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
107 See Feldman, supra note 36, at 350 (explaining
that "by the late eighteenth century,
American rationalists and evangelicals alike argued... that the purpose of nonestablishment
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ers perceived as establishments were cast in terms of liberty of conscience' °s and equal civil rights. °9 Central features of the established
church in England undoubtedly impinged on the liberty of dissenters, and a common anti-establishment claim in the early republic was
that a government violates liberty of conscience when it taxes individuals to support religions to which they do not subscribe."0 Translating claims about equal rights into ones about free exercise-when
people suffer discrimination in rights because of religion, their free
exercise is impaired-is not difficult. However, even if equality is
treated as distinguishable from free exercise, a claim of equal rights
concerns individual rights. Such a claim could cover any preferences
given to one or more denominations to the exclusion of others. In
brief, whatever the perceived substantive coverage of the Establishment Clause, people did not understand it in a political sense as divorced from individual rights. And it would require much too refined a distinction to suppose that, according to language or
intention, all individual rights claims about religion were packed into
the Free Exercise Clause, leaving for the Establishment Clause only
those aspects of establishment that did not concern individual rights.
As long as one sees disestablishment as connected to liberty of
conscience and equality of rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Equal Protection Clause, appropriately could make much
of its content applicable against the states. Note that I am not addressing here three possible objections to incorporation: (1) that the
whole doctrine of incorporation is misconceived; (2) that since the
Establishment Clause was designed substantially to protect state establishments, it should not have been read later to bar state establishments; and (3) that some particularviolations of the Establishment
Clause should not be seen as involving individual rights. I am here
answering only the assertion that the Establishment Clause, in its entire scope, is not about individual rights.
The standing issue has much less significance for our purposes. If
it were true that individuals should have standing only for violations
of basic constitutional rights, that is, individual rights, much of what
the Establishment Clause covered, as we have just seen, would fall
within that category." But, in fact, individuals who are injured may
was to protect the liberty of conscience of religious dissenters from the coercive power of government").
108 See id. at
351-52.
109 See generally Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity:
The Eighteenth-Centuiy Debate About
Equal Protection and Civil Rights, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 295 (examining historical debates on the
establishment of religion in order to explain current notions of equal protection).
0 SeeFeldman, supranote 36, at 351.
i It is arguable whether all failures to comply with the clause would give rise to individual
claims. In that respect, it is worth noting that states set standing requirements for state cases,
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sue even if the basic constitutional duty is owed to a different political
branch rather than to individuals. Thus, we might say that the federal government owes a political duty to states not to interfere with
purely intrastate commerce, but an individual adversely affected by a
law that exceeds the authority of Congress can challenge the law on
the ground that it impinges on the sovereignty of states. Thus, no
straightforward connection exists between "political duty" and a lack
of standing for individual claimants.

III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND INCORPORATION
Have the religion clauses appropriately been made applicable
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? Again, our
major inquiry is about the Establishment Clause.
I shall say little about the general debate over incorporation. The
Supreme Court has decided that the great majority of the rights in
the Bill of Rights were made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is still sharply debated
whether the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to restrict the states by a panoply of rights previously held only against the
federal government. 12 Insofar as they did intend to do so, the vehicle
that they had mainly in mind was not the Due Process Clause but the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, which subsequently received a very
narrow interpretation in the Slaughter-House Cases.13 Assuming that
the adopters intended to create some new rights against the states,
beyond whatever equality rights the Equal Protection Clause generates and the evident procedural rights of the Due Process Clause, it is
arguable whether they intended to guarantee the same rights one
finds in various clauses of the Bill of Rights or rather a more fundamental core
of rights, such as rights "implicit in a concept of ordered
14
liberty."

and that state decisions are reviewable by the Supreme Court, so long as a "case or controversy"
requirement is satisfied. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
12 Philip Hamburger has recently suggested that people in 1868 did not understand the
Fourteenth Amendment to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. See HAMBURGER,
supra note 57, at 436-38 (noting that those who wanted First Amendment-style rules for the
states advocated for a specific constitutional amendment to that effect and did not presume the
Fourteenth Amendment to have incorporated the Bill of Rights). A contrary view is urged by
Akhil Amar and Richard L. Aynes. See AMAR, supra note 27, at 163-214 (discussing the text and
history of the writing of the Fourteenth Amendment); Richard L. Aynes, On MisreadingJohn
Bingham and the FourteenthAmendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 61 (1993) (asserting thatJohn Bingham,
the Fourteenth Amendment's principal author, intended the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states).
113 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
114 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan,J., concurring) (quoting Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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I believe many of the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment did
mean to protect basic federal rights against the states. Whether they
meant to protect rights to the same degree as against the federal government is hardly clear, but federal courts needing to elaborate
rights against both federal and state governments reasonably treat the
rights as having the same scope. To put the point concretely, it
makes sense to regard the same kinds of actions as unconstitutional
impingements on freedom of speech or freedom of religion, whether
the infringing government is federal or state. That, in any event, is
the approach the Supreme Court has taken, and it is no longer controversial. " 5 One can imagine an argument that not every government action that would violate the Free Exercise Clause should be
taken to violate a fundamental right to religious freedom, but once
one accepts the idea that the scope of rights will ordinarily be the
same, whether the putative violator is federal or state, one must concede that states enjoy no special latitude with respect to free exercise
that they do not have for freedom of speech or of the press.
Indeed, the interesting possibility for free exercise is the opposite
one of lesser protection against the states. According to some scholars, the original clause was not intended to create any right to violate
neutral laws for religious reasons. But by the end of the Civil War,
people may have had a different view of the exercise of religion,
based partly on the experience of abolitionists and on laws forbidding
slaves to read, which prevented them from reading the Bible. " 6 By
then, many people may have believed that the exercise of religion
needed to be protected against some laws that were not designed to
attack religion or discriminate among religions. Akhil Amar has suggested a further, textual argument that the very phrase "privileges or
immunities," and the rule that "No state shall make or enforce any
law"' 1 7 which abridges these privileges or immunities, lend themselves

115

Justice Thomas has recently questioned whether the Establishment Clause should be ap-

plied to restrict the states at all or to the same extent as it restricts the federal government. See
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I
would acknowledge that the Establishment Clause is a federalism provision, which, for this reason, resists incorporation. Moreover, as I will explain, the Pledge policy is not implicated by any
sensible incorporation of the Establishment Clause, which would probably cover little more
than the Free Exercise Clause."); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-79
(2002) (ThomasJ, concurring).
116 See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1106, 1131-56 (1994) (claiming that the separate
spheres theory disappeared as a consequence of the clash between abolitionists and slavery's
suppression of religious exercise, thereby rendering the idea that religion and government had
"wholly distinct concerns" untenable). The idea that the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment would have conceived a general free exercise right to be exempted from neutral laws is
challenged in HAMBURGER, supranote 57, at 436 n.112.
117 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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to a conclusion that a state's enforcement of a neutral law that impinges on religious freedom can violate that clause." 8 On this understanding, the Fourteenth Amendment actually provides protection of
the exercise of religion that differs in kind from, and is significantly
more extensive than, the coverage of the original Free Exercise
Clause. Were the Supreme Court to reason to this conclusion, it
would almost certainly proceed a step further and rule that free exercise rights against the federal government should now replicate free
exercise rights against the states." 9
The issue about incorporation of the Establishment Clause is
more complex. We have already reviewed and rejected the straightforward claim that the Establishment Clause created a political duty
rather than individual rights, and thus was not an appropriate candidate for incorporation via guarantees of individual rights. Two more
nuanced arguments in favor of the same conclusion remain.
The first of these is that if the clause was originally understood in
1789 to reserve to states the power to establish or disestablish religion
as they chose, it violates that aspect of the clause to use it now as imposing anti-establishment restrictions on the states. 20 The claim
would be plausible if the jurisdictional component of the clause had
remained a constant. The answer to the claim lies in history.
In 1833, Massachusetts repealed its system of support for religion.' 2' Although many states continued practices we might now regard as establishments, including Bible reading in public schools and
religious tests for office, no state then had a structure of relations between government and religion that many people regarded as establishing religion. 22 Thus, the jurisdictional aspect of the Establishment Clause, the aspect that protected state decisions to establish,
had disappeared in significance by the mid-nineteenth century. People then regarded the clause as stating a principle of government appropriate for states as well as the federal government, and a number
of states before the Civil War created constitutions that included establishment clauses modeled on the federal provision, clauses indis118 See AMAR, supra note 27, at 43.
N9 This approach would follow the theory according to which the federal Due Process Clause
has been extended to include equal protection ights afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. SeeBollingv. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
120 See Snee, supra note 104, at 407 (concluding that incorporating the Establishment Clause
into the Fourteenth Amendment may actually curtail religious freedom).
1 AMAR, supra note 27, at 251.
1

See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablish-

ment Principle,27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1117 (1995) (discussing how states in the mid-nineteenth
century retreated from exercising power over the subject of religion). Douglas Laycock puts it
this way: "By the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, the consensus against establishment of
religion was nearly universal, leaving only disagreements about the boundaries of that principle." Laycock, supra note 2 (manuscript at 37).
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putably anti-establishment in their content.2 Recognizing that by
1866, the substantive, anti-establishment aspect of the clause far exceeded its jurisdictional aspect in public perception, we can comfortably conceive the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment as making the anti-establishment aspect applicable to the states. 2 4 In short,
we can both acknowledge that the original clause was significantly jurisdictional and accept incorporation
of the substantive component
25
of the clause against the states.
Another argument against incorporation plays on the individual
rights theme but in a more complicated way than the theory that the
Establishment Clause was exclusively about political duty. Here is
that argument.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects free exercise rights and
(unspecified) equality rights against the states. These are concededly
individual rights. No doubt, the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause overlap significantly in their coverage, and in some
domains the Supreme Court has reasonably said that laws or state
practices impinge on both free exercise and nonestablishment. 126
And, if the Equal Protection Clause is rightly taken to condemn classifications other than racial ones, treating religious classifications as
"suspect" is a natural extension. Thus, the Establishment Clause
overlaps coverage of both the Free Exercise and the Equal Protection
Clauses. Since the Equal Protection Clause is in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Free Exercise Clause is reasonably incorporated
by it against the states, the proper approach is to treat the Fourteenth
Amendment as reaching only those violations of nonestablishment
that also violate one of these other clauses. Thus incorporating the
Establishment Clause, which does not sound like an individual right, is
unnecessary, because the other two clauses will do whatever work is
called for. In practical terms, aspects of the Establishment Clause
that do not concern free exercise or equality would not apply to the
states.

123 See AMAR, supra note 27, at 249-54.
124 See id. (discussing how states in various regions had adopted anti-establishment
clauses in
their respective state constitutions by the 1860s); see also Lash, supra note 122, at 1146 (noting
that several framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not distinguish between incorporating
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause).
125 Akhil Amar goes further. He contends that the original clause was entirely jurisdictional

but underwent a transformation sufficient for it to be incorporated. AMAR, supranote 27, at 3442,
16 One such domain is the legal rules states adopt to resolve disputes
between contesting
factions of churches. See Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over
Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1843, 1852-53, 1857 (1998) (discussing two cases in which
the Supreme Court ruled that interferences with church government violated both religious

clauses).
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This approach is coherent, but it may be too refined for wise decision making. Any support for some religions over others implicates
concerns about equality (and even support for religion in general
could deny equality to nonreligious or antireligious claimants) ; 27 and
many establishment problems involve concerns about the exercise of
religion by outsiders or dissenters. Forjudges to try to skim off those
laws or practices they would want to characterize as actual violations
of the Establishment Clause (were the federal government to engage
in them) but not as violations of free exercise or equal protection by
states, might not be worth the effort.12 8 Incorporating the Establishment Clause, whose substantive content broadly implicates both free
religious exercise and equality, is much more straightforward.
The Blaine Amendment of 1876 and its subsequent state counterparts are not serious obstacles to incorporation. 12 The proposed
amendment's provisions were more explicitly stringent about financial aid to religion than the original Establishment Clause, and debate about the amendment centered on the issue of public aid to sectarian schools.so I assume that people at the time did not generally
suppose that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated most of the
Bill of Rights; one partial explanation is that the 1872 Slaughter-House
Cases had shut off an expansive reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 3 1 In any event, the near passage of the Blaine Amendment reveals an intense concern about government support for religion, not any opinion that the Establishment Clause was particularly
disqualified for incorporation. Insofar as the amendment does pose
a problem for incorporation, it suggests that contemporary opinion
was contrary to the whole notion of incorporation, not that people
had a view about the unsuitability of the Establishment Clause, in particular, being applied to the states.

17 See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356-57 (1970) (Harlan,J., concurring) (ad-

dressing the inequalities present in federal law that exempts only those persons whose opposition to military service is based on religious training and belief).
128 Much would depend on how extensively judges construed the Free Exercise and Equal
Protection Clauses, and whether they interpreted the Establishment Clause as placing serious
limits on aid received by religious groups according to neutral, nonreligious criteria (a practice
they would not be likely to view as violating free exercise or equal protection).
1

See Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 65
(1992)

(concluding that many senators found the Blaine Amendment's incorporation provision superfluous given what states did in their own constitutions).
130 Id. at
66.
1I ld. at 62 (questioning whether Senator Frelinghuysen,
a major proponent of the Blaine
Amendment, had always believed the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Bill of
Rights or whether "his opinion had been formed since the Slaughter-House Cases").
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IV. MODERN INTERPRETATION

I shall say very little about modern interpretation. We know that
many Supreme Court interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause
and of the free speech and free press guarantees of the First
Amendment cannot be defended on originalist grounds, at least if
one looks to the original understanding of acceptable and unacceptable practices, rather than the vague general purposes of the provisions. In this respect, the religion clauses are far from special. If one
accepts such a general evolution of doctrine over time as legitimate,
one should not fault what the Supreme Court has done with respect
to the religion clauses as involving some special usurpation of power.
It does not follow, needless to say, that all of the Court's decisions are
justified in light of relevant considerations. I certainly do not believe
they are. I disagree sharply with the Court's restriction of free exercise rights, and I am troubled by its exclusive focus in recent aid cases
on neutrality as the key to compliance with the Establishment
Clause. 13 2 But whatever may be one's objections to the Court's jurisprudence of the religion clauses, the difficulty is not that the Court
has cast aside the moorings of an ascertainable original understanding in some unusual, indefensible manner.
CONCLUSION

By far the most plausible reading of the original religion clausesbased on their text, the history leading up to their enactment, and
legislation enacted by Congress-is that Congress could protect but
not impair free exercise in carrying out its delegated powers for the
entire country and within exclusively federal domains, that Congress
could neither establish a religion within the states nor interfere with
state establishments, and that Congress could not establish religion
within exclusively federal domains. Accordingly, both a "no power"
reading of the clauses that Congress could not have legislated about
religion, and a purely 'Jurisdictional" reading that Congress could
have established religion within federal domains (and perhaps also
prohibited free exercise) are mistaken. Actions by the First Congress
under the Constitution suggest that its members did not have an expansive view of what measures were, in the language of the First
Amendment, "respecting an establishment of religion."
Because the jurisdictional aspect of the Establishment Clause that
protected state establishments had vastly diminished in significance
132 My

views about free exercise are developed at length in my forthcoming book, RELIGION

AND THE CONSTITUTION, VOLUME I: FAIRNESS AND FREE EXERCISE

presently working on Volume II about the Establishment Clause.

(forthcoming 2006).

I am
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by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, that clause, as well as the
Free Exercise Clause, have been appropriately incorporated against
the states-assuming that incorporation of other clauses of the Bill of
Rights is appropriate. The modern Supreme Court's treatment of
the scope of the religion clauses cannot be justified on originalist
grounds, whether one takes the original understanding of forbidden
practices at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, or the original understanding of forbidden practices when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted. However, the latitude with which the Supreme Court has departed from these original understandings is no
greater than it has exhibited with other parts of the First Amendment
and with other guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Whatever other bases
one may have to criticize the Supreme Court's religion clause jurisprudence, it is not distinctly unfaithful to original understandings.

